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REVIVING NATIONAL MUFFLER: ANALYZING THE
EFFECT OF MAYO FOUNDATION ON JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE AS APPLIED TO GENERAL
AUTHORITY TAX GUIDANCE
Matthew H. Friedman*
INTRODUCTION
The topic of judicial deference arises each time a court reviews the
legitimacy of an opinion or regulation by an administrative agency to which
Congress has delegated some rulemaking authority. Determining the
appropriate deference standard is important because it sets limits on an
agency’s quasi-legislative power and informs taxpayers and practitioners on
the likelihood of challenging seemingly invalid administrative rulings.
Noting the importance of the deference issue, Professor Kristin E.
Hickman,1 one of the foremost authorities on administrative law in the
federal income tax context, wrote that “[d]rawing fine distinctions among
deference standards may seem a purely academic exercise . . . [but]
deference standards matter.”2
For thirty-five years, the 1944 case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
presented the primary method for judicial review of administrative guidance
created under Congress’s general grant of rulemaking authority.3 In 1979, a
new standard was created in what became known as the tax-specific
deference standard of National Muffler Dealers Association v. United
States.4 Five years later, the Supreme Court held in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that a separate and much more
deferential standard should apply to final regulations drafted pursuant to a
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Kristin E. Hickman is a Professor of Law at University of Minnesota Law School. Professor
Hickman has published over a dozen articles on the subject of judicial deference as it relates to tax law
and other areas of the law; several are cited throughout this Essay. Her work has been cited several times
in various U.S. Supreme Court briefs, nine times by various federal courts of appeals, and once by the
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (link), which is heavily
examined in this Essay. Finally, Professor Hickman has been a key participant in dozens of Faculty
Research Workshops, Symposia, Conferences, and Bar presentations.
2
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1250 (2007) (link).
3
323 U.S. 134 (1944) (link).
4
440 U.S. 472 (1979) (link).
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general grant of authority.5 The Chevron decision cast doubt upon the
viability of both Skidmore and National Muffler since it was unclear
whether the decision applied to all regulations promulgated pursuant to
general grants of authority and whether it applied to tax-related guidance.
This confusion persisted until the Court decided two cases in 2000 and
2001 that distinguished between Skidmore and Chevron deference.6
Unfortunately, the Court’s distinction did not provide specific or uniform
direction for the treatment of all general authority guidance and to this day
the Court has failed to give clearer instruction.
In early 2011, the Court took a step closer to addressing the treatment
of non-regulation general authority guidance by considering final
regulations in the tax context. In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research v. United States,7 the Court conclusively answered the
question concerning which standard (Chevron or National Muffler) applies
to final Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to the general grant of
authority.8 The Court concluded—without attempting to overturn or replace
National Muffler—that all final regulations should be reviewed under
Chevron. However, the court failed to address the still unsettled question of
which standard to apply to guidance other than final regulations, which can
come in many forms and accounts for the vast majority of guidance
available to taxpayers. Presently, the default review standard is Skidmore,
but National Muffler provides a more balanced approach that can be applied
to all forms of general authority regulations rather than just non-regulation
guidance.
This Essay explores the various standards of deference the Supreme
Court has applied to general authority guidance over the past sixty-eight
years and concludes that the Court should revive National Muffler as the
dominant standard in the tax context. Part I discusses the role that deference
plays in deciding tax-related issues in court, specifically presenting the
current application of final Treasury regulations for background.9 Part II
5

467 U.S. 837 (1984) (link).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that interpretations based on
general authority are typically not afforded the same Chevron deference as specific grants of authority,
but such deference is possible based on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the language
and the process through which the interpretation was created); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000) (holding that interpretations such as those in opinion letters—”interpretations contained
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law”—
do not warrant deference under Chevron) (link)
7
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (link).
8
The general grant of authority to make rules and regulations necessary for applying and
administering the laws of Congress is made under § 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006) (link).
9
Throughout this Essay, the terms “Treasury,” referring to the United States Department of the
Treasury, and “Service,” referring to the Internal Revenue Service bureau within the Treasury, are used
interchangeably. Within the executive branch of government are several administrative agencies, which
include the United States Department of the Treasury. The Treasury is run by the Secretary of the
6

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/14/
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examines the path the Supreme Court followed in establishing and applying
judicial deference from Skidmore through Mayo. Part III discusses the
necessity of the Mayo decision, analyzes its holding, addresses the
weaknesses of the existing standard for general authority guidance, and
proposes a broad application of the former tax-specific standard from
National Muffler. Part IV offers concluding remarks.
I. The Role of Judicial Deference
In order to properly discuss the distinctions between different
deference standards, it is essential to understand the function of judicial
deference and the source and development of the administrative authority.10
A. Function of Judicial Deference
Since the earliest days of Congress, there have been delegations of
quasi-legislative power to executive branch agencies in the form of
particularized rulemaking and interpretations for the purpose of enforcing
and administering the law.11 Likewise, there is a long history of judicial
challenges to the administrative rules derived from these delegations. When
a rule is challenged, a court must determine how much weight to give to the
agency’s interpretation of the law drafted by Congress. Courts should defer
to agency regulations because Congress has delegated power to the agency

Treasury. Beneath the Secretary are several bureaus, which constitute 98% of the Treasury’s work force
and who are each led by a Commissioner. The Internal Revenue Service is the bureau charged with
determining, assessing, and collecting internal revenue. Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service
issues guidance to taxpayers and uses its expertise to assist the Treasury in creating Internal Revenue
Code regulations. See generally About Bureaus U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/bureaus/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 2,
2012) (describing and listing the roles of Treasury Bureaus) (link). See also Kristin E. Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure
Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1729 n.6 (2007) (noting that, while the
Treasury is delegated the authority to draft regulations, it is usually the Service that creates the initial
drafts of public guidance) (link).
10
While this Essay primarily discusses the difference between specific authority and general
authority Treasury regulations, other forms of general authority guidance include—but are by no means
limited to—Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, Technical Advice memoranda, and Private Letter
Rulings.
11
See, e.g., Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (creating a quasilegislative power in the executive branch through congressional delegation by requiring that those
subject to the statute observe all rules and regulations created by the President or his appointees) (link).
The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which regulated trade with Indian Tribes, held that all persons
must observe all “rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe” or as prescribed by the
“superintendent of the department, or of such other person as the President of the United States shall
appoint . . . .” Id. See also Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, § 4, 3 Stat. 22, 26 (prescribing that “the
Secretary of the Treasury shall establish regulations suitable and necessary for carrying [the Act for the
assessment and collection of direct taxes and internal duties] into effect; which regulations shall be
binding . . . and also frame instructions for the said assessors . . . .”) (link).
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to interpret and enforce the laws.12 Except for laws necessitating greater
judicial scrutiny—like those that curtail civil rights—it is a constitutional
norm that a court generally may not strike down a law passed by Congress
unless it is unconstitutional, vague, unclear, or arbitrary. It follows that
where Congress has delegated some of its power to an administrative
agency, a court should not arbitrarily disregard the agency’s conclusion.
Rather, the court should consider the value of the agency’s interpretation
before ignoring it. In fact, the Supreme Court requires full deference to
some agency rules so long as the rule is reasonable and the statute being
interpreted is ambiguous.13
How much weight an interpretation should receive is not always clear.
Nor is it always clear which deference standard a court applied when it
reviewed an agency interpretation. This makes it difficult for other courts to
determine the proper standard to apply to a particular set of facts.
Historically, the standard was often dependent on the form of the delegation
made by Congress and the form and content of the agency pronouncement
itself. The task of determining how much deference a court should give to a
particular regulation or rule comprises a significant portion of a larger body
of law—administrative law—that spans multiple areas of substantive law.
Deference is important because it has a direct impact on the likelihood
that an agency regulation will be upheld in court. Moreover, knowing how
much weight a court will give an agency’s interpretation may result in more
or less freedom for a particular agency in crafting its regulations.14 If an
agency’s regulations tend to receive a great amount of deference, then the
people drafting the regulations may take a more controversial position
among the other reasonable interpretations available when addressing an
ambiguous or silent Code section.
B. Deference to the Treasury
For decades, the scope of the Treasury’s regulatory authority has been
controversial as courts have failed to agree on a particular deference
standard or set of standards. Administrative law, as a whole, traditionally
distinguishes between rules with the same force and effect as congressional
statutes and non-binding rules that are simply intended to provide guidance

12
Another reason for deferring to agency interpretations is the institutional competence of agencies.
Where most courts hear cases from all areas of the law, agencies develop specialized knowledge in their
particular area. For a list of cases highlighting courts’ reliance on agency expertise, see infra note 95.
13
For a discussion of where a court is required to show controlling deference to an agency
interpretation, see infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text.
14
See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2006) (“Settling the question of deference toward Treasury
regulations carries significant implications for both tax jurisprudence and tax policy.”) (link).
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and explanation.15 The former type of rule is known as a legislative rule and
the latter as an interpretative rule. In tax law, legislative rules (also referred
to as specific or direct authority) are those where Congress made an express
delegation among the provisions of a specific Code section.16 The majority
of administrative rules are interpretative rules issued pursuant to the general
mandate of Code § 7805(a), which permits the Treasury to prescribe rules
and regulations necessary to effectively administer the law.17 These general
authority rules and interpretations—sometimes called interpretative
authority or indirect authority—are the main subject of this Essay.
Over time, deference to Treasury regulations has departed from general
administrative law principles and aided the creation of what is often
referred to as “tax exceptionalism.”18 Tax exceptionalism signifies the
notion that the treatment of tax-related matters under administrative law is
different from other bodies of law because of inconsistency and blurred
lines between specific and general authority guidance; administrative law
dictates that legislative rules are binding while interpretative rules are nonbinding guidance.19 However, in tax law over the past twenty-five years,
15

See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:11 (3d ed. 2011) (quoting
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 99
(1941)) (“In addition to the power to enact legally binding regulations conferred upon many agencies, all
of them may, if they wish, issue interpretations, rulings, or opinions upon the laws.”); Hickman, supra
note 14, at 1571 (“[T]he common understanding was that general authority Treasury regulations were
interpretative and nonbinding . . . .”); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial
Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 650–51 (2012) (referring to a law review article from
1941 on the influence of regulations, Lederman notes that, prior to the Administrative Procedure Act,
interpretative regulations were binding as a matter of law on Treasury officers and agents but not upon
taxpayers) (link).
16
See GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES
160 (8th ed. 2010) (introducing the concept of interpretative and legislative regulations).
17
See id. Because interpretative rules are issued pursuant to a general mandate, they are sometimes
called “general authority” regulations whereas legislative rules are sometimes called “specific authority”
regulations. Id. at 160–61. Section 7805(a) states “the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code], including all rules and regulations as may
be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.” I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
This same Code section also authorizes, subject to certain constraints, retroactive applications of
regulations. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2006) (identifying limits and appropriate uses of retroactive
regulations) (link).
18
See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 14, at 1540 (explaining the sources of tax exceptionalism). There
is a “belief that the tax area has its own, unique deference tradition . . . .” Id. “[T]he emphasis of the
existing scholarship on the uniqueness of the tax field—and the resulting complexity that this focus has
added to what otherwise should be a fairly simple analysis—are emblematic of a perception of tax
exceptionalism that intrudes upon much contemporary tax scholarship and jurisprudence.” Id. at 1541.
See also Kristin E. Hickman, Agency Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?,
89 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2011) [hereinafter Hickman, Agency Specific Precedents] (detailing possible
reasons for the emergence of tax exceptionalism and explaining why courts and practitioners allow this
condition to persist) (link).
19
See KOCH, supra note 15 (discussing the traditional view that there are legislative rules which are
binding and non-legislative rules which are interpretative and non-binding); see also Thomas W. Merrill
& Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L.
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both types of rules were often afforded equal deference treatment as applied
to final Treasury regulations.20 Professor Hickman asserts that “[t]his
terminological dissonance has generated tremendous confusion” relating to
the proper creation and review of interpretative rules.21 Much of the
lingering confusion, however, has been settled by the recent Mayo decision.
As discussed in Part II, with its holding in Chevron that specific and general
authority regulations should be treated the same,22 the Supreme Court
largely eliminated the issue of distinguishing between final Treasury
regulations derived from specific and general authority. Unfortunately,
Chevron did not settle the question of how much weight to apply to other
forms of guidance and did not address its potential or intended impact on
the tax-specific, National Muffler standard. Far from a tax case, Chevron
involved a regulation regarding air quality standards set by the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act.23 Thus, it is not
difficult to see why courts—including even the Supreme Court—were
unsure which standard to apply in the face of National Muffler and tax
exceptionalism. As a result, post-Chevron decisions on administrative
rulings seemed to follow one of two different paths of review.24

REV. 467, 476–77 (2002) (“Legislative rules are those that have the force and effect of law. From the
perspective of agency personnel, regulated parties, and courts, these rules have a status akin to that of a
statute.”).
20
See Hickman, Agency Specific Precedents, supra note 18, at 92 (noting that the tax community
and judiciary have a “longstanding habit of labeling general authority Treasury regulations as
interpretative rules, even though the regulations are legally binding and thus clearly legislative in
general administrative law parlance.”). As discussed throughout this Essay, non-regulation guidance
issued pursuant to general authority has not been directly dealt with in recent Supreme Court decisions
relating to judicial deference. In fact, these cases leave room for one to argue that either Skidmore or
Chevron is applicable to a particular piece of guidance given the proper factual circumstances. Thus,
there is a need for the court to clarify which standard should be applied to this other body of
administrative guidance.
21
See id. at 92–93. (commenting on the variances between how courts review regulations of
different administrative agencies, such as the Treasury, when administrative law is intended to be
applied evenly across all agencies); id. at 98 (“[T]he tax community’s habit of labeling specific authority
Treasury regulations as legislative rules and general authority Treasury regulations as interpretative rules
represents an instance of general administrative law shifting direction while agency-specific
understandings maintain course. The consequences of this split have been substantial.”).
22
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of the agency.”). For a discussion of the lingering
confusion regarding deference toward final Treasury regulations after Chevron, see infra Part II and
accompanying notes.
23
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41 (discussing the facts of the case).
24
See Hickman, Agency Specific Precedents, supra note 18, at 106–07 (“[S]ome courts cited both
Chevron and National Muffler as supporting deference to reasonable Treasury regulations, even as they
seemingly applied one standard or the other.”). Courts tended to apply either Chevron or the tax-specific
case of National Muffler.
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One path is the two-step test developed in Chevron, which takes a
fairly objective approach to the deference question.25 First, a court must ask
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue in a
clear and unambiguous manner. If yes, then the statute applies. If no, step
two is to ask whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute that is neither arbitrary nor capricious. If the
construction is reasonable, the regulation controls and the court must defer
to the agency interpretation in deciding the case.
The other path is the National Muffler standard, which takes a more
subjective approach that considers a list of factors for a court to review. 26
These factors include the length of time the regulation has been in effect,
the purpose of the statute and regulation, reliance placed upon the
regulation, and the consistency of the regulation’s application by the
Service.27
In January 2011, twenty-six years after Chevron, the Supreme Court
finally addressed the lingering question of whether tax-related cases should
apply Chevron or National Muffler analysis. The Mayo decision held that
final Treasury regulations created under general authority should receive
Chevron treatment the same as non-tax matters created under general
authority.28 While the Court’s decision has an important impact on final
Treasury regulations, the decision was silent on the issue of other
administrative guidance, which has received relatively little judicial
scrutiny when one takes into account the vast quantity of such authority
issued by the Treasury. Other administrative authority issued pursuant to
Congress’s general grant of authority is typically subject to a lesser level of
review and therefore is often referred to as secondary administrative
authority.29
25

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (explaining the two-part test for reviewing an agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers).
26
See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (describing relevant
considerations to be considered in determining whether a regulation should have force).
27
An even more subjective approach—arguably too subjective—is to follow the Skidmore standard.
Skidmore instructs courts to show deference to the extent an interpretation holds the power to persuade.
Power to persuade relates to the formality with which the guidance was created and the expertise of the
drafting agency. Skidmore is rarely applied to cases involving regulations. Under current law, it appears
to apply only to non-regulation guidance. For a discussion of Skidmore deference, see infra Parts II(B)
and III(D)(2), and accompanying footnotes.
28
See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011)
(“Our inquiry . . . does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific.”).
The Court notes that, while it previously distinguished between specific and general authority
regulations, “the administrative landscape has changed significantly” and an equivalent level of
deference is “appropriate when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law.” Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court further
noted that “[t]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context.”
Id.
29
Although most Treasury regulations are issued pursuant to a general grant of authority rather than
specific, these regulations are typically not considered secondary authority.
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Secondary administrative authority constitutes the majority of guidance
issued by the Treasury. One author has identified as many as twenty-five
different methods by which the Treasury can issue interpretations or other
guidance to taxpayers.30 The courts have dealt little with the weight that
should be given to these pronouncements. However, determining the proper
level of deference toward secondary authority is very important because it
gives taxpayers and the Service a measure of which Treasury
pronouncements are truly binding in a judicial setting. This in turn aids the
drafting of future guidance.
What largely distinguishes regulations from other interpretations is the
level of formality with which they are promulgated. The Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)31 mandates a notice-and-comment process.
Compliance with the APA is required for final and temporary Treasury
regulations and gives such regulations greater weight than guidance issued
through a less rigorous process. Most of the guidance promulgated by the
Treasury and Service is not “formal” like the regulations codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations.32 Despite not being subject to the APA, the
Service treats much of its secondary authority, such as revenue rulings and
revenue procedures, as binding to taxpayers with the same set of facts
addressed in the guidance. That is to say, examiners at the Service largely
base their reviews on guidance published by the Treasury rather than
judicial interpretations of the Code. Determining the level of deference that
courts should show to these informal pronouncements will provide more

30

See Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323 (2008)
(examining both the reliance on and the retroactive applicability of several forms of Service guidance)
(link). The forms of guidance offered include Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, Announcements
and Notices, Letter Rulings, various Agreements, Technical Advice Memoranda, Chief Counsel Notices
and Advice, Field Legal Advice, Litigation Guideline Memoranda, Acquiescence and Actions on
Decision, News Releases and Fact Sheets, Coordinated Issue Papers, Appeals Settlement Guidelines,
Audit Guides, Directives, and Oral Communications. See id. at 323–24. (listing forms of Service
guidance available).
31
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (link).
32
See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal
Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 44 (2006) (referring to the vast amount of non-regulatory
guidance and labeling guidance that has not gone through the APA’s notice and comment procedure as
“informal” rather than “formal”) (link). Pietruszkiewicz elaborates:
The focus of discussion has been the degree to which formal agency guidance
carrying the force of law should be given deference. Nevertheless, informal
agency guidance accounts for an overwhelming percentage of the guidance issued
by administrative agencies. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the impact of
informal guidance and to utilize a standard that recognizes the expertise of those
that Congress charges with implementation of a statutory scheme.
Id.
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information and greater transparency to taxpayers while increasing
consistency in enforcing the Code.
The APA dictates several procedural requirements for drafting agency
regulations, which the APA refers to as rules. Chief among these
requirements is the need to provide “general notice of proposed rule making
[by publishing the proposed rule] in the Federal Register” and to allow the
public to have an opportunity to “participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation.”33 To the extent practicable, given the aim and policy
constraints of each regulation, the drafters are charged with incorporating
the comments and suggestions from the public in forming the final version
of the rule. Failure to follow the requirements could result in a court
invalidating the regulation.34 By subjecting the regulations to public notice
and comment, the APA is viewed to improve the quality of agency
rulemaking and ensure fairness to affected parties while providing a “welldeveloped record that enhances the quality of judicial review.”35
The APA includes an exception from the notice-and-comment
requirement for interpretative rules.36 Administrative law regards
interpretative rules as those promulgated under the general authority of
Code § 7805(a). The Service maintains that “most IRS/Treasury regulations
are interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment
provisions of the APA.”37 Nevertheless, “the Service usually solicits public
comment when it promulgates a rule.”38 However, following Mayo, the
distinction between types of regulations is essentially moot because the
Court held that legislative and interpretative regulations should receive the
same treatment. A key issue today is not whether a regulation is legislative
or interpretive for the purposes of complying with the APA, but whether
other forms of guidance should be considered interpretative or legislative
and subject to the APA’s requirements. Similarly, there is uncertainty how
non-regulation guidance might be treated if it were issued after public
notice and comment.

33
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006) (link). Additionally, upon issuing final regulations, the APA
requires that the agency include a “concise statement of their basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(link). As noted by Professor Hickman, these “concise” statements, which often appear as the preambles
to final regulations, tend to be more comprehensive than concise due to the close attention courts pay to
them upon judicial review. See Hickman, supra note 9, at 1733 (mentioning effect of judicial
expectations on final regulation preambles).
34
See, e.g., Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 373, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (invalidating a rule
because the FCC failed to issue proper notice after amending the proposed rule) (link); MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (striking down a rule for failing to provide
adequate notice) (link).
35
Sprint, 315 F.3d at 373 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
36
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (2006) (link).
37
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (2011) (link).
38
See id.
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II. THE LONG MARCH TO MAYO: DEVELOPMENT OF SUPREME COURT
DEFERENCE JURISPRUDENCE
Leading up to Mayo, one could identify four standards of deference
that may be applied by a court reviewing a rule or decision by the Treasury
or Service. At one end of the spectrum, a court may give no deference to the
agency determination and impart its own independent judgment. At the
other end is Chevron deference, which grants great deference to agency
determinations. In between lies the intermediate “Skidmore standard”39 and
the “National Muffler standard”; both of which are considered to offer a
sliding-scale approach, with National Muffler less subjective and taxspecific.
A. Intermediate Standard – Deference Under Skidmore
In Skidmore, several firefighters sought overtime pay for the time spent
in the fire hall beyond their typical hours.40 They challenged an informal
conclusion of the Administrator of the Department of Labor’s Wage and
Hour Division who determined in a Bulletin that employees are not entitled
to additional compensation during times when they are not actually
working.41
The Supreme Court noted that such rulings are not binding on the
courts, but that the Court “has long given considerable and in some cases
decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of
the Treasury.”42 According to the Court, administrative regulations, rulings,
interpretations, and opinions are subject to some deference because they are
created by an agency in accordance with the agency’s official duty and
based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations than
information that is likely available to a judge. The Court held that deference
“will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration” and “its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”43
The intermediate level of deference created in Skidmore allows a
reviewing court flexibility in deciding whether to follow the conclusion or
interpretation of an administrative agency or draw its own conclusion. The
Court made no distinction between sources of the authority granting
agencies the power to interpret laws. In fact, it stated that an agency’s ruling
or interpretation will not be “controlling upon the courts by reason of their

39

The Skidmore standard comes from the Supreme Court case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944).
40
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135 (1944).
41
Id. at 139.
42
Id. at 140.
43
Id.
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authority.”44 The Court’s holding has typically been applied to only general
authority rulings; specific authority rulings are automatically granted
greater deference. Under Skidmore, a court will only adopt an agency’s
interpretation based on general authority where factors can be identified that
warrant giving special weight to the agency’s views.
Following the Chevron decision, which effectively expanded the strong
form of deference to general authority rules, the viability of Skidmore was
unclear and the holding went dormant. Then in 2000 and 2001, the Supreme
Court revisited Skidmore, and confirmed its holding, in Christensen v.
Harris County and United States v. Mead Corp.45 In each case, the Court
considered the applicability of Chevron to non-regulation guidance issued
pursuant to a general grant of authority.
In Christensen, the court considered whether Chevron’s high level of
deference should be conferred to a non-binding Department of Labor
opinion letter.46 Specifically rejecting Chevron, the Court noted that “we
confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at
after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”47 The Court continued by pulling language from Skidmore to
express that informal interpretations are “entitled to respect under our
decision in [Skidmore], but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the power to persuade.”48 Through its decision, the Court pronounced that
Skidmore is the principal method for interpreting the vast array of informal
rulemaking by administrative agencies.
The following year, the Court again turned to Skidmore after refusing
to apply Chevron deference to a letter ruling.49 The ruling letter from the
U.S. Customs Service stated that day planners imported by the petitioner
should be considered “bound” diaries rather than “unbound” diaries as
argued by the petitioner.50 The Court noted in its holding that Chevron
deference is generally applicable in formal administrative rulemaking where
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law. While
the use of notice-and-comment procedures is “significant,” the lack of that
procedure “does not decide the case.”51 A key reason for rejecting Chevron
was that the Court found no indication that Congress meant to delegate
44

Id.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–33 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (both cases clarifying that Chevron is not limitless and that Skidmore governs a
wide range of administrative interpretations that do not carry congressionally authorized legal force).
46
See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581 (discussing conclusion of the opinion letter issued by the
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division).
47
Id. at 587.
48
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
49
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31 (refusing to apply Chevron due to the informal nature of the rule at
issue).
50
See id. at 224–25 (noting that unbound diaries fell into a tax-free subcategory of the statute).
51
Id. at 230–31.
45
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authority to the U.S. Customers Service to issue clarification rulings with
the force of law.52 In rejecting Chevron deference on this issue, the Court
stated that there is “room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here” because
the matter of the classification is one where the expertise of Customs may
be of use and “therefore at least seek a respect proportional to its power to
persuade.”53
Hence, after Chevron raised questions about Skidmore’s influence,
Christensen and Mead confirmed that Skidmore is still alive and serves as
the applicable deference standard for most administrative pronouncements
other than regulations. These cases effectively limited the scope of
Chevron’s broad power by stating that not all general authority guidance is
entitled to Chevron’s strong deference. While these cases reduce the reach
of Chevron by excluding general authority guidance that Congress would
not reasonably expect to be binding, the language in Mead also gives way
to the possibility that some non-regulation guidance may be deemed to
qualify for Chevron deference under the proper circumstances. Though not
necessary, this outcome would be especially likely if the agency were to
adopt the ruling under a more formal process, such as issuing the rule for
notice and comment or holding an adjudicative hearing.
In Mead, the Court observed that it does not matter whether Congress
expressly delegated rule making authority if it is:
[A]pparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority
and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in
the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not
actually have an intent as to particular result.54
Although the long-time consensus was that non-regulation guidance “was
nonbinding and merely advisory in nature,” the interplay between
Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead, has placed such guidance “squarely in the
gray area of the force of law concept.”55
B. Tax-Specific Standard: Deference under National Muffler
In National Muffler, the Supreme Court established a more detailed test
for final Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the Treasury’s general

52

See id. at 231–32 (highlighting the major factor in the Court’s decision).
Id. at 325 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
54
Id. at 229 (internal quotations omitted).
55
Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 239, 258 (link). Professor Hickman claims that proper deference probably falls under either
Chevron or the less deferential standard of Skidmore. See id. at 256.
53
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grant of authority. The deference issue in National Muffler was simply how
much weight the Court should give to the regulation in question. The
regulation contained a definition of “business league,” an ambiguous term
from the statute being interpreted.56 In making its decision, the Court began
by considering whether it should defer to the general authority regulation.57
As a preliminary matter, the Court decided that deference should be shown
where statutory language is ambiguous and the proper agency, pursuant to
congressional delegation, exercised its mandate to provide all needful rules
and regulations for enforcement of the law. Following this determination,
the Court said to:
[L]ook to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the
plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A
regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the
regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it
evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are
the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the
reliance placed on it, the consistency of the
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny
Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent
re-enactments of the statute.58
Ultimately, the Court decided the regulation was subject to deference and
left the Service’s definition undisturbed.59
This holding effectively created an additional standard of judicial
deference that most courts interpreted as applying primarily to tax matters
due to the context of the decision. Because the test considers multiple
factors in making a deference determination, a range of outcomes is
possible, thus resembling a sliding scale. Depending on how closely a
regulation matches the factors, a court could grant no deference, serious
deference, or anything in between.
C. Chevron Standard
Five years after National Muffler, the Supreme Court decided Chevron.
The Chevron decision was a landmark case in administrative law. It is
56

Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979).
See id. at 476–77 (describing how to determine “whether a particular regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner”).
58
Id. at 477.
59
See id. at 484, 488 (concluding that “the Commissioner’s view . . . merits serious deference” and
that “the Association has not shown that either the regulation or the Commissioner’s interpretation of it
fails to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner”).
57

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/14/

127

107:115 (2012)

Reviving National Muffler

important for two main reasons. First, it established the famous two-part
test for evaluating administrative interpretations of the law. Second, it
expanded applicability of the strong deference due to specific authority
guidance to include interpretations based on general authority. However,
the broad reach of Chevron was trimmed back several years later by Mead.
The Court described the test for evaluating agency interpretations as
follows:
[W]hether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter . . . . If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, . . . [and] the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.60
The Court went on to state that “controlling weight” must be given to
administrative interpretations where Congress has “explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill.”61 Where there is a specific delegation or a specific grant
of authority, the reviewing court must follow any non-arbitrary agency
interpretation. The Court then added that “[s]ometimes legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit.”62 Thus, Chevron makes the case for giving complete deference to
interpretations based on the Treasury’s general rulemaking authority only
where Congress has made a specific delegation among the provisions of a
statute.
In 2005, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that strengthened
the power of agency interpretations, but without expanding the scope of
Chevron. In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services (Brand X)63 the Court considered the validity of an
interpretation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that
appeared contrary to the language of the Communications Act of 1934.64
The Ninth Circuit, relying on its own precedent rather than Chevron,
rejected the FCC’s interpretation.65 The Supreme Court reversed,66
reasoning that a “court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 844.
545 U.S. 967 (2005) (link).
See id. at 975, 977–79.
See id. at 979–80 (relying on AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (link)).
See id. at 1003 (“The Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than we

are.”).
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agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and leaves no room for agency
discretion.”67 Thus, the Brand X Court made a strong statement about
agency supremacy and called for a strict textual reading of a statute to
evaluate an agency ruling.
Though quite powerful, the reach of Chevron remains limited to rules
and regulations where it appears Congress intended, explicitly or implicitly,
for an agency to fill gaps. In determining whether an implicit delegation
was made, the Chevron Court considered whether there appeared to be any
congressional intent to enlarge or confine the scope of an agency’s power.
If there was congressional intent to enlarge the scope, then a general
authority regulation would be viewed under Chevron. However, the Court
never discussed what factors should be considered in determining whether
Congress intended a general grant of authority to produce an administrative
interpretation that would be legally binding. In Mead, the Supreme Court
indicated that the level of formality with which an interpretation is created
gives some indication as to the intent of Congress, but this alone “does not
decide the case.”68
III. MAYO: WHAT THE COURT SAID, DIDN’T SAY, AND SHOULD HAVE
SAID ABOUT GENERAL AUTHORITY GUIDANCE

A. The Need for Mayo
Leading up to the Mayo decision, courts were split on whether
Chevron or National Muffler was the proper standard for the review of
Treasury pronouncements. In some circuits, courts applied Chevron for
most regulations, but applied Skidmore for some general authority
regulations—promulgated without prior public notice and comment—as
well as all other forms of administrative guidance. In other circuits, courts
applied National Muffler when the issue concerned a tax matter, regardless
of whether there was general or specific authority.69 Still others presented
the two standards as indistinguishable by applying them both to support the
67

Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). The Court further stated that “[i]t is fair
to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation
that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.” Id. at 230.
69
For instance, the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal declared that Chevron provided the
appropriate standard for evaluating general authority Treasury regulations. See, e.g., Swallows Holding,
Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (link); Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139 (2006),
aff’d, 507 F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2007) (link); Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Sidney v. Comm’r,
948 F.2d 289, 304–05 (6th Cir. 1991) (link). Conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded that National
Muffler was the proper standard. See, e.g., St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 1394, 1400 n.11 (8th
Cir. 1994) (link).
68

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/14/

129

107:115 (2012)

Reviving National Muffler

same conclusion.70 Even the Supreme Court went back and forth on the
issue.71 Finally, in early 2011, the Court seized an opportunity to provide
further guidance and delivered Mayo, specifically addressing the Chevron–
National Muffler issue.
B. What Mayo Said
In Mayo, the Supreme Court addressed the legitimacy of a Treasury
regulation interpreting the statutory exemption in the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) from the duty to pay social security taxes. Under
FICA, “employees” are exempt from paying social security tax for services
“performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes” at
a school, college, or university.72 In December 2004, after public notice and
comment, the Service amended a regulation, providing that employment is
“incident” to a student’s studies only if the educational aspect of the
individual’s relationship with his or her employer predominates over the
service aspect.73 Medical residents spend most of their time, “anywhere
from 50 to 80 hours per week,” caring for patients and participating in a
structured educational program.74 The Mayo Foundation (the “Foundation”)
filed suit to obtain a refund of taxes it had withheld on stipends paid to its
medical residents, arguing that the Treasury regulation was invalid.
Although the district court agreed with the Foundation, the Court of
Appeals reversed. Seeing an opportunity to address the Chevron–National
Muffler quandary, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court held that Treasury regulations, like the rules of other
administrative agencies, should be reviewed by courts under the Chevron
standard. The Court considered it necessary to maintain “a uniform
approach to judicial review of agency action” and viewed the deferential
approach of Chevron as appropriate given treatment among other agencies
and the expertise of agencies in making complex policy choices.75 Applying
70
See, e.g., Redlark v. Comm’r, 141 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (link); Snowa v. Comm’r, 123
F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (link); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. United States, 955 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir.
1992) (link); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1128, 1137–38 (5th Cir. 1990) (link).
71
In United States v. Boyle, the Court held that Chevron should apply to the challenge of a general
authority Treasury regulation. 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) (link). The Court then held in Cottage
Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner that the National Muffler factors should be considered in evaluating a
general authority Treasury regulation. 499 U.S. 554, 560–62 (1991) (link). Years later, the Supreme
Court again applied Chevron and National Muffler while reviewing two separate challenges to general
authority regulations. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003) (link); Atlantic Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382 (1998) (link).
72
See I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2006) (link).
73
See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3) (2005) (link). The regulation also provided that the
student social security tax exception does not apply to any individuals normally scheduled to work as an
employee for forty or more hours per week, and it included as an example an individual employed by a
university as a medical resident. See Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3), 2(e) (2005).
74
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 708–09 (2011).
75
Id. at 713.
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Chevron, the Court found that the statutory provision excepting students
from FICA taxes was ambiguous, thus passing the first step of the two-part
test. Under the second step, the Court concluded that the regulation
excluding medical residents from the carve-out was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Therefore, the regulation was upheld. The
Court noted that regulations, like legislation, require some line-drawing and
the Service therefore was justified in adopting the more administrable
categorical exemption rather than the more resource-intensive case-by-case
approach advocated by the Foundation.
In its analysis, the Court expressly rejected the multi-factor National
Muffler test for evaluating final Treasury regulations in the face of an
ambiguous statute and firmly established that Chevron provides the
appropriate deference standard for such regulations.76 As support for its
conclusion, the Court relied on Mead’s declaration that “Chevron deference
is appropriate [for general authority pronouncements] where it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”77 The Mayo Court also stated
that “[o]ur inquiry . . . does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of
authority was general or specific.”78 Interestingly, the Court’s acceptance of
Mead’s deference analysis, which essentially applies the second step of
Chevron, appears contradictory to its plain statement that the inquiry should
not depend on whether authority was general or specific. It is difficult to
reconcile the Mayo Court’s decision to adopt Mead—which reduced the
reach of Chevron by saying not all types of general authority regulations
should receive controlling weight—while at the same time holding that the
review of a regulation does not turn on the type of regulation.79
The Supreme Court highlighted Brand X80 as an occasion where it
applied Chevron deference to a general authority regulation promulgated
after public notice and comment. In Brand X, the Court held that the FCC
was delegated “the authority to promulgate binding legal rules” under
statutes that gave the Commission “the authority to execute and enforce,
and to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions of the Communications Act of
1934.”81 This language is nearly identical to the delegation of general
76
See id. at 714 (“We believe Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler . . . provide the
appropriate framework for evaluating the full-time employee rule.”).
77
Id. at 713–14 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).
78
Id. at 714.
79
Recall that Mead constricted Chevron’s reach by stating that not all general authority regulations
are afforded Chevron deference. For a discussion of Mead’s holding, see supra notes 49–53 and
accompanying text.
80
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
81
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011) (quoting
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81) (internal quotations omitted).
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authority to the Treasury under Code § 7805(a).82 In Brand X, as in Mead,
the Court indicated that a rule promulgated pursuant to general authority
may be granted Chevron deference where the rule is not inconsistent with
the statute being interpreted and Congress may have reasonably expected
for the rule to be binding. Also as in Mead, the Court did not distinguish
between the various forms of rulemaking that find their origin in general
authority regulations, such as revenue rulings and procedures. Therefore, it
is possible for the Service to argue that the broad guidelines of Mead,
combined with the strong deference language in Mayo, should result in
greater judicial deference toward some informal agency rulemaking.
C. What Mayo Didn’t Say and the Potential Implications of Its Omission
In Mayo, the Supreme Court settled the debate over whether Chevron
deference applies equally to finalized general authority regulations issued
by the Treasury as it does to the general authority regulations of other
administrative agencies. It does apply equally. In so holding, the Court
relied on Mead and Brand X, which provide broad guidelines for when a
general authority regulation may be reviewed under the Chevron standard.83
Mead noted that specific authority regulations are automatically reviewed
under the Chevron standard, but general authority regulations may not
always be reviewed under this standard. However, in neither of these cases
did the Court specifically address whether or how the broad guidance
provided should be applied to the judicial review of general authority
guidance other than Treasury regulations.
The Mayo decision flatly stated that general authority regulations are
subject to Chevron deference like specific authority regulations. By default,
all other rulemaking is subject to Skidmore deference. In actuality, the
Court was stating that general authority regulations meeting the description
in Mead should be reviewed under the same standard as specific authority
regulations because these regulations were created with the intent that they
carry the force of law. This holding ignores any guidance other than final
Treasury regulations and provides little help in deciding when a general
authority regulation is intended to carry the force of law. The Court’s
failure to distinguish between Treasury regulations and other forms of
82

Compare Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (link) (stating the
Commission may “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to
carry out the provisions of” the communications Act of 1934), with I.R.C. § 7805(a) (stating that the
Secretary of the Treasury may “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement”).
83
See Hickman, supra note 14, at 1601. While Mead clearly attempts to add structure to the
question of Chevron’s scope, Mead’s holding nevertheless contains its own analytical holes. At a
minimum, the framework articulated in Mead leaves open for further consideration two major questions:
How should the courts determine whether Congress has delegated to an agency the requisite
administrative authority, and—even if the requisite delegation exists—which interpretive processes
represent exercises of such congressionally delegated authority? Both questions turn on the vague “force
of law” concept, for which the Court has provided only minimal guidance. Id.
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guidance issued pursuant to the same general grant of authority creates the
potential for unfair treatment to taxpayers who are bound by rulemaking
that is not subject to the higher procedural standards of most Treasury
regulations. The Court’s silence on the matter of Chevron’s applicability to
non-regulation guidance and the relatively loose standards set in Mead for
determining whether Chevron deference is general authority rulemaking
leaves the doorway open for the Treasury to issue traditionally non-binding
guidance and argue that it should be subject to Chevron deference.
Mayo’s holding enhances the executive branch’s quasi-legislative
authority at the expense of the taxpayer by cutting away at the taxpayer’s
ability to effectively challenge such rules in court. Multiple practitioners
interviewed following the release of the decision noted that the Treasury’s
legislative authority has never before been greater.84 The Mayo decision
acknowledges that regulations may include drawing lines to improve
administration and enforcement of the law. This emphasis on ease of
administration at the expense of fairness may ultimately undercut a court’s
assessment of a rule’s reasonableness. As Chief Counsel William J. Wilkins
noted for the Service regarding the Mayo decision:
[W]e recognize that this is a moment to consider for
ourselves the implication of the famous quote about great
power bringing with it equally great responsibility. The
thesis behind Chevron deference is based on agency
competence and integrity. The relevant opinions focus on
the agency’s knowledge of the subject matter, the agency’s
ability to consider secondary and tertiary effects on
stakeholders and the regulatory system writ large, and the
agency’s ability to consult at length with affected internal
and external parties. We recognize that all of this implies
the need to make choices based on wise public policy.85
By noting the significance of the APA’s notice-and-comment
procedures, the Mayo decision draws attention to the fact that Treasury
regulations issued pursuant to general authority, which are deemed
interpretative rules for APA purposes and not subject to its procedural

84
See Alison Bennet, ‘Mayo’ Ruling Raises Bar for Challenges to Tax Regulations, Practitioners
Say, 43 DAILY REP. EXEC. (BNA), at K-3 (Feb. 14, 2011) (reporting on the Service’s expanded
authority). One practitioner notes that Mayo is “giving the IRS more leeway in legislating than in
administering the law” and that this is “arguably more authority than [the Service has] had in the past.”
Id. Another practitioner believes the ruling “puts a pretty heavy burden on those who are now going to
argue that regulations are invalid.” Id. A third expressed concern that the decision “hasn’t left any room
to challenge regulations.” Id.
85
2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 22–15 (Feb. 2, 2011).
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requirements, have been issued without public notice and comment.86 This
creates some concern. On one hand, the Supreme Court in Mayo says that a
court’s inquiry should not turn on whether a regulation was issued pursuant
to specific or general authority. Yet, on the other hand, compliance with
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures has repeatedly been referenced
by the Supreme Court as a significant indication that a regulation should be
given Chevron deference. This apparent conflict widens the path for further
administrative rulemaking—issued as binding authority—to be reviewed
under the Chevron standard, regardless of whether there was a formal
public notice and comment procedure.
D. What Mayo Should Have Said
Mayo should have developed a clearer standard that covers the
treatment of regulations and non-regulations since both are created pursuant
to § 7805(a). A better solution would have been for the Court to hold that
National Muffler governs all general authority regulations, as was
previously the law for tax matters. First, by enforcing National Muffler, a
court would no longer need to determine whether a regulation issued
pursuant to § 7805(a) was intended to carry the force of law before
engaging in Chevron analysis. Second, National Muffler is a more
appropriate test for determining the proper weight of non-regulation
guidance. Finally, the Mayo decision left open the possibility that National
Muffler may still be applicable in certain situations.
1. Eliminating Need to Engage in Multiple Analyses
A confusing aspect of the Mayo holding is the Court’s statement that it
has “expressly recognized the importance of maintaining a uniform
approach to judicial review of administrative action” due to its apparent
conflict with earlier precedent.87 This statement is confusing because the
essence of Mead’s holding is that not all general authority regulations are
alike; some carry the force of law while others do not, and each is subject to
a different deference standard. Under Mead, if it turns out the regulation
was intended to carry the force of law, then a court would have to apply
Chevron. If it appears the regulation was not intended to be treated as
legally binding, then a court must apply Skidmore. Thus, the Mead analysis
functions as a “step zero” to be applied before the two-step Chevron test or
Skidmore analysis. In comparison, applying National Muffler would
eliminate the need to perform multiple tests. Under National Muffler, all
guidance issued pursuant to § 7805(a) would be analyzed under the same
set of factors: harmony with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and
its purpose; whether it is substantially contemporaneous with the statute;
86

See Hickman, supra note 9, at 1730 (noting that Treasury has often failed to adhere to the APA
rulemaking requirements in issuing regulations deemed to be interpretative rather than legislative).
87
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/14/

134

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

reliance on the guidance; consistency of interpretation; and degree of
scrutiny.
Since National Muffler operates as a sliding scale, there is nothing that
prohibits a court reviewing a regulation under this standard from granting
strong deference. Despite following different analyses, applying National
Muffler or Chevron could both conclude that a general authority regulation
issued after public notice and comment or an administrative hearing is
permitted complete deference. The difference is that a court following
Mayo’s holding would conclude the regulation is controlling because Mayo
requires the application of Chevron, whereas the finding under National
Muffler would be based on the fact that public notice and comment or an
administrative hearing—in addition to the other relevant factors—tends to
enhance the authority of a particular regulation and therefore warrants
greater deference. Under Chevron as explained in Mayo, even a rule that
has not undergone public notice and comment may still receive controlling
deference. Therefore, replacing the Mead–Chevron analysis of Mayo with
National Muffler does not prevent a court from arriving at the same
conclusion. Instead, it reduces the overall steps required in a review and
balances interpretative power more evenly between the agency and
judiciary by considering what it is about the regulation that merits lesser or
greater deference.
2.

National Muffler Offers a More Appropriate Test than Skidmore
for Non-Regulations and Chevron for Regulations
Under current law, if a rule or regulation issued pursuant to the general
grant of authority by Congress is not deemed to have been created with the
intent that it possesses the force of law, then that piece of guidance will be
reviewed under Skidmore. Recall that Skidmore provides for deference on
the basis of a rule’s consistency with prior pronouncements and its
persuasive power.88 Without more specific guidance, like the National
Muffler factors, this standard can result in extreme unfairness to either
litigant. First, the test is entirely subjective and, thus, places too much
power in the hands of the courts. Second, as a completely subjective test,
Skidmore disregards the importance of Congress’s delegation and offers too
little protection for agencies.89
By counseling courts to consider “all those factors which give [the
regulation] power to persuade,” Skidmore gives courts the power to justify a
wide and potentially unpredictable range of conclusions that may offer little
guidance to taxpayers or the Service.90 The Mead Court claimed that
88

For a discussion of Skidmore’s intermediate deference, see supra notes 39–44 and accompanying

text.
89
See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 14, at 1552 (“By its own terms, Skidmore ‘respect’ is both limited
and open ended. Skidmore allows a reviewing court to be the final arbiter of whether the agency’s
interpretation is persuasive . . . .”).
90
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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“totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for
uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation.”91 Further, this purely
subjective approach affords the Service hardly more deference than if a
court were reviewing the matter de novo.
Under Chevron, a regulation receives either controlling deference or
none at all. The outcome depending on whether the court believes the
regulation is a “permissible construction of the statute,” which has been
interpreted to mean a reasonable interpretation.92 Contrary to Skidmore,
which places too much power in the hands of the court, Chevron is a largely
objective test that places too much power in the hands of the agency. The
reasonable standard test sets the bar too low for an agency with the power
to promulgate binding regulations without at least complying with the
requirements of the APA.
Compared to Skidmore and Chevron, National Muffler offers a better
compromise between judicial independence and deferential treatment for
general authority guidance. National Muffler instructs courts to consider a
list of factors that give the courts a meaningful guide for determining the
proper weight of an agency interpretation. These factors can help ensure
that decisions have some consistency and that there will be some uniformity
among courts’ analyses. Under this standard, power is more evenly
balanced between the Service and the courts in a way that is consistent with
the manner of Congress’s legislative delegation. The Service is afforded
some deference which it is owed based on its expertise and Congressional
delegation, but the level of deference is considered against other factors that
may reveal the rule being challenged is in fact improper or invalid. Also,
courts may still make subjective determinations, but the determinations will
be based on a defined set of factors that limit potential abuse and
inconsistency.
One of the often-cited criticisms of the less deferential National
Muffler approach is the concern that something less than Chevron deference
will impede an agency’s ability to adapt its policy to societal changes if
those changes are inconsistent with the statute or prior rulings. For instance,
in Brand X the Court averred that the Court of Appeals’s decision to follow
precedent over applying Chevron deference would inhibit the agency’s
ability respond to changed factual circumstances or administrations and
“lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law by precluding
agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous
statutes.”93 This fear is unfounded. The National Muffler standard does not
suggest that courts strictly following precedent. Rather, it instructs courts to
consider consistency with prior construction of the interpretation and
congressional intent in order to understand the reason for a change. This
91
92
93

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981, 983 (2005).
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process of challenging an agency to explain the reason for an inconsistent
regulation imposes the need for an agency to fully develop its reasoning for
the change and fosters greater transparency in the administration of the law.
Unlike Brand X, which calls for reading the plain terms of a statute without
considering congressional intent or the purpose of a statute, National
Muffler advocates a more holistic review of the interpretation that takes into
account the language of the statute, its origin, its purpose, congressional
intent, the time the regulations have been in effect, reliance placed on it,
consistency with past interpretations, and the level of scrutiny given by the
Congress during any re-enactments of the statute.94
Another reason Chevron is touted as the better standard for reviewing
agency guidance is the institutional expertise of the Treasury and Service
devising the regulation.95 Specialized knowledge and experience present a
strong justification for deference and should be given some weight, but not
necessarily controlling deference. Founded largely by reliance on agency
expertise, Chevron grants controlling deference to any reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute regardless of whether it appears
inconsistent with the language of the statute or prior interpretations, or even
if it was promulgated as a temporary regulation before notice and comment
or retroactively under § 7805(b) in response to an unsuccessful litigation
position. This does not produce the best result. The reasonable basis
analysis under Chevron represents the lowest standard of legislative review,
and yet agency guidance is not legislation that has been drafted, negotiated,
and passed by elected members of Congress. Rather, agency guidance
exists because Congress delegated some of its legislative power to
supplement the agency’s enforcement powers. Furthermore, while the
Treasury was charged with the task of enforcing Congress’s laws, it alone
does not create tax policy. Thus, it is wrong to place all our faith in the
institutional competence of one agency. It makes more sense for a court to
follow National Muffler, which incorporates the intent of Congress and
purpose of the statute into its review of an agency’s interpretation. Also, a
majority of tax related matters begin litigation in the Tax Court, which
holds at least as much expertise as members of the Treasury and does not
need to rely entirely on the agency’s explanation of a statute.
3.

National Muffler Not Dead

94
See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (describing the
factors a court should consider in reviewing an agency rule).
95
See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011)
(noting that formulating policy is “complex” and requires “more than ordinary knowledge respecting the
matters subjected to agency regulations”); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (“The Commission is in a far
better position to address these questions than we are”); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (suggesting that
Congress believed “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so . . .”); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“[R]ulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator . . . do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment[.]”).
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Despite being dealt a heavy blow when the Supreme Court decided
Mayo, there is reason to believe that National Muffler is not dead. It
remains possible that the Supreme Court may later cite National Muffler as
the proper standard for interpreting informal agency guidance other than
final Treasury regulations. In Mayo, the Court stated that Mayo did not
present “any justification for applying a less deferential standard of
review . . . [and] in the absence of such justification, we are not included to
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”96
This language appears to reserve for the Supreme Court an argument that
National Muffler should be used to interpret guidance other than final
Treasury regulations. During a D.C. Bar Taxation Section panel discussion
of judicial deference under Mayo, Ronald Buch of Bingham McCutchen
LLP postulated that National Muffler has not ended because “[w]hen you
have something other than a final [Treasury regulation] subject to notice
and comment, aren’t you really back at the same sliding scale?”97 Similarly,
Christopher Rizek of Caplin & Drysdale Chartered said the “next front” for
litigation on judicial deference will focus on non-regulation guidance, in
which case National Muffler “may still be viable.”98
CONCLUSION
The degree of deference conferred to the interpretation of a statute by
an agency charged by Congress with administering that statute has been
steadily and often confusingly shifting for decades. Courts reviewing final
Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to general authority have been
afforded no deference, controlling deference, and various degrees in
between, including a standard specifically for tax issues. Under current law,
final Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to general authority that
satisfy the APA or similar procedural hurdles receive total deference under
Chevron while other guidance receives deference only to the extent it
possesses the power to persuade under Skidmore.
Courts have not directly considered the issue of guidance other than
final Treasury regulations, such as temporary regulations, revenue rulings,
and revenue procedures. However, such guidance constitutes the majority
of taxpayer guidance, and the Service has noted that it will follow its own
published guidance, including revenue rulings, as though this guidance was
binding precedent.99 For these agency interpretations, courts should adopt
96

Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
J.P. Finet, Despite Supreme Court’s ‘Mayo’ Ruling, Practitioners Say ‘National Muffler’ Not
Dead, 43 DAILY REP. EXEC. (BNA), at K-3 (Mar. 4, 2011).
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Id.
99
See Lederman, supra note 15, at 26 n.131 (Chief Counsel attorneys may not “argue contrary to
final guidance” nor “rely on case law to take a position that is less favorable to the taxpayer in a
particular case than the position set forth in published guidance” (quoting Chief Counsel Notice CC2003-014 (May 8, 2003))).
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National Muffler’s multi-factored, case-by-case analysis rather than the proTreasury Chevron doctrine or ambiguous Skidmore analysis.
This Essay does not suggest that National Muffler is a perfect method
for reviewing informal administrative guidance. Rather, it suggests that of
the existing standards of review, National Muffler best avoids Skidmore’s
problem of circumventing the legislative process by inappropriately
applying Chevron and failing to provide consistent guidance or give any
consideration to the knowledge and experience of agencies. The National
Muffler standard strikes an appropriate balance between agencies like the
Treasury and the courts. In applying the complex administrative law
framework of the Treasury under § 7805(a), National Muffler offers the
fairest alternative for taxpayers and the government.
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